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QUANTIFIERS, INFERENCE, AND 
    VARIABLE BINDING
                           Taisuke Nishigauchi 
1. Introduction 
 This paper considers the linguistic and logical problems 
raised by sentences like the following, which was first 
presented and discussed by the philosopher, P.T. Geach (1962, 
 1972)." 
 (1) The man who owns a donkey, beats  iti. 
The problem will be briefly stated as follows: what is the 
correct characterization of the anaphoric relation between the 
quantified NP a donkey and the pronoun that appear in (1)? 
To put it more technically, our problem will be rephrased as: 
what is the adequate semantic representation of the anaphoric 
relation as seen in (1) at the level of logical form (LF)? This 
problem is not as easy to solve as it appears to be at first sight. 
The NP a donkey is a quantifier phrase associated with the 
existential quantifier. The necessity for this treatment is 
validated by the sentence (2), in which there is a scope 
interaction between the existential quantifier associated with a 
donkey and the universal quantifier associated with every man,
 *This is a radically revised version of Chapter III , §  §3.2.1-3.2.3 of my M.A. 
thesis. I wish to thank Professor Yoshinobu  Mori for comments and discussions on 
the earlier version of this paper. 
1) Similar examples are presented in Geach (1972), which are the following. 
   (i) Every/No/Some man who stole a  booki from Snead madea lot of money 
       by selling  iti. 
The following example, which is also due to Geach (1972), requires a more 
elaborate analysis. 
   (ii) Every man who borrows a  booki from a  friend.] eventually returns  iti to  hi
m-              1'
For an analysis of this sentence along the line of the approach adopted in what 
follows, cf. §3.2.6.1 of Nishigauchi (1979) 
•
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the latter having wider scope (on the normal interpretation). 
  (2) Every man who owns a  donkeys beats  its.
This pronoun cannot be simply viewed as a constant term 
bearing the same index as a donkey, for a quantified NP 
cannot normally  'bind' a constant: a binding relation holds 
only between a logical operator and an individual variable that 
appears in its scope. 
  Up to the present, there have been two proposals presented 
for the solution to this problem. One proposal, put forth by 
Geach (1972) (only as a tentative solution), is to allow a 
donkey to take the whole sentence as its scope. On this 
analysis, (1) will be assigned a logical form more or less like 
 (3). 
  (3)  (ax: donkey)  (  (  Ey: man) ( (y owns  x)  A y beats  x)  ) 
If this analysis were correct, then we could regard the pronoun 
in (1) as a variable bound by the topmost existential 
quantifier. However, this proposal immediately fails  visa vis 
the example (2): the logical form (4), which is required by this 
analysis, does not stand for the correct interpretation for this 
sentence. 
  (4) (ax:  donkey)((Vy  : man)(y owns x  --> y beats x)) 
For, this logical form says that there is a (certain) donkey such 
that every man(as a group) owns and beats it. However, the 
sentence (2) does not allow of such  an interpretation. Instead, 
(2) should be construed as  'for every man, if there is a donkey 
that he owns, then he beats the just-mentioned donkey (that 
he owns)'. But if this is the case, we would be forced to 
stipulate that the existential quantifier take narrower scope 
than the universal. On the other hand, there is an independent-
ly motivated principle in the linguistic literature (e.g. cf. 
Lasnik (1975)), which states that the scope of a quantifier is
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specified as the S or NP that dominates it, or in other words, 
everything that is (c-)commanded by the quantifier. The 
(near-) surface structure for  (1)—(2) would be something like 
(5) (assuming that semantic rules operate on this structure).2)
(5)                    S 
      NP                              VP 
Det  N V NP 
   N S 
      I 
 theemanwho owns adonkey beats it
As this tree diagram indicates, the quantified NP a  donkey 
cannot take the root  S in its scope, and its scope is specified as 
S that is contained in the relative clause: such being the case, 
the quantified NP cannot bind the pronoun that appears under 
VP, which is outside  S. The observation so far makes it 
sufficiently clear that the logical forms (3)—(4) are not correct 
representations for  (1)—(2). 
 Another proposal, due to May (1977), is that the pronoun 
in  (1)—(2) be treated simply as a  'free' variable, a variable that 
is not bound by any logical operator, and that its value may be 
satisfied by any entity in the domain of discourse: so, as a 
possible interpretation for this sentence, May claims, an entity 
may be chosen that is a member of the domain of the 
antecedent quantifier phrase a donkey, for the assignment of 
the value to the free variable. However, such an analysis also 
fails, given sentences like the following. 
  (6) a. *The man who doesn't own a  donkey; beats  iti. 
     b. *The man who  wns  leevaechndonkeyi beats  i ;. 
2) Although the purpose of this paper is not to argue for any specific theoretical 
framework, I will tentatively adopt the framework of interpretive semantics. 
However it is fairly easy to translate the notations adopted here into the generative 
semantics framework.
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If the pronoun it is allowed to be free, and furthermore, to be 
assigned  'any arbitrary entity' as its value, as May assumes, 
then, why is it impossible to assign it an entity that is a 
member of the domain specified by  each/every donkey in 
(6b)? Furthermore, the impossibility of the anaphoric relation 
in (6a) would be a mystery altogether for such an approach. 
(To this, we will return below.) Intuitively, the difference 
between (1) and (6) with respect o the anaphora possibility 
seems to be attributable to the different properties of the 
quantifiers associated with the antecedent NP's. So, May's 
proposal will be radically weakened to the extent that it gets 
deprived of its theoretical interest, because his claim is now 
shown to be adequate  only for the anaphoric relations whose 
antecedent NP is associated with the existential quantifier (in 
the non-negative context). In other cases, such as (6), his logic 
cannot be maintained. 
 The discussion thus far has made it clear (i) that the 
pronoun that appears in  (1)—(2) cannot be simply regarded as 
a constant term, nor as a bound variable, or a  'free' variable; 
and (ii) that what makes the anaphoric relations in  (1)—(2) 
possible is the special property of the existential quantifier 
associated with the antecedent NP, in contrast to other 
quantifiers as seen in examples like (6). 
2. Discourse Referent Formation Rule 
2.1 On closer inspection, it turns out that the anaphoric 
relations as seen in  (1)—(2) are very akin, or substantially 
identical to, the phenomenon of  'discourse referents', as seen 
 in  (7). 
  (7) John has a  car;  . He keeps in the garage. 
For detailed discussion, cf. Karttunen (1969). In (7), the
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indefinite NP introduced in the first sentence is referred to in 
the second sentence by means of the definite pronoun. The 
anaphoric relation as seen in (7) is identical to that involved in 
 (1)—(2), in that in either case the indefinite NP is related to a 
pronoun that appears outside the c-command domain of the 
 antecedent." Furthermore, as the following paradigm shows, 
the anaphoric relation as seen in  (1)—(2) is subject to the same 
constraint as that on sentences like (7): if the indefinite NP is 
commanded by the negative, modal, or a verb of propositional 
attitude (or, so-called  'opaque' verb), the anaphora possibility 
is ruled out. 
  (8) a. John doesn't have a  car;. *He keeps  it in the garage. 
     b. *The man who doesn't own a  donkey; beats  it.
  (9) a. John may have a cart.  ?*He keeps  it in the garage. 
     b.?*That man, who may own a  donkey;, beats  it;.
 (10) a. Mary believes that John has a cart.  (*)Iti's in the 
         garage. 
     b.(*)The man who wants to own a  donkey; beats  it;. 
However, it should also be noted that if both the antecedent 
indefinite and the pronoun appear in the (c-)command domain 
of the negative, modal, and the opaque verb, the anaphoric 
relation is permitted. 
 (11) a. You can't eat a  cake; and have  it;. 
     b. It is not the case that the manwho owns a  donkey; 
        beats  it;. 
     c. No manwho owns a  donkey; beats  it;. 
 (12) a. You may have a  cake; and eat  it;. 
     b. It is possible that the man who owns a  donkey; 
        beats  it;.
3) A node a  ` c(onstituent)-commands' a node  0 if neither a nor  13 dominates 
the other and the first branching node which dominates  a dominates  0. Reinhart 
(1976) claims that a quantifier phrase can bind a pronoun (as a variable) only if the 
former c-commands the latter.
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 (13) a. John wants to catch a  fishi and eat  its. 
     b. John believes that the man who owns a  donkeys 
        beats  its. 
In all the cases in (8)—(13), the indefinite NP is used non-
specifically. Although the matter is by no means clear-cut, 
I take it that an indefinite NP is used nonspecifically iff that NP 
does not admit of the implication that the referent of that NP 
exists (in the domain of discourse), or it does not admit of the 
inference of Existential Generalization. Thus, it is a common 
property shared by such logical predicates as the negative, 
modal, and the opaque verb to block Existential Generaliza-
tion with respect to the indefinite NP that appears in the 
(c-)command domain of these  predicates.4) (For detailed dis-
cussion, cf.  loup (1977) and Nishigauchi (1979).) Now, it is a 
significant generalization obtained from the discussion so far 
that a nonspecific indefinite cannot be linked with a definite 
pronoun that appears outside the (c-)command domain of the 
predicate which does not admit of Existential Generalization, 
but that a nonspecific indefinite surely can be linked with a 
pronoun that also appears in the (c-)command domain of the 
 nonspecificity-inducing predicate. This is exactly what is 
happening in  (11)—(13).5)
4) There are other predicates that show the same property: negative implicative 
verbs and other predicates which have the negative implication in their complement 
sentences (for details, cf. Karttunen (1971)), and so-called  'creative' verbs such as 
make, write, etc., among others, do not admit the  indefinite that appears in their 
complement to be linked with a pronoun outside its c-command omain. 
   (i) Mary  preVented John from buying a  typewriteri. (??)  14 was an IBM. 
       (negative implicative) 
   (ii) Erica is writing a  novel. (??) She likes  its. (ok on the reading  'she likes 
       writing the novel') 
       cf. Erica is copying a  noveli. She likes  14. 
5) The matter is further complicated by facts like the following. 
 (i) *John may take a  girli to the party and he must kiss  heri. 
 (ii) John must take a  girli to the party and he may kiss  heri. 
These sentences suggest hat anyone working on this problem has to take into 
account the inclusion relations of possible worlds between modals and other
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2.2 In this paper, I shall try to incorporate a somewhat 
modified version of  'Invoking Description Rule', originally 
proposed by Nash-Webber (1978a,b), into the framework of 
the currently available semantic theory. This rule, which I 
refer to as  'Discourse Referent Formation Rule' (DRFR), is 
roughly stated below. 
 (14) Discourse Referent Formation Rule (DRFR): 
      V —  (axi)  (a  .  .  .  Fxi  .  .  . ) — W — G(proi) — Y  —> 
      (az) (z  =  (txi)  (a  .  .  .  F;  .  .  . ) — W — Gz) 
      where, F and G are arbitrary predicates.
This rule roughly says that if there is a pronoun outside the 
scope of the existential quantifier, and if this pronoun bears 
the same (referential) index as the indefinite NP associated 
with the existential quantifier, then a definite description is 
invoked which is of the form  'the x such that x F's'. However, 
in light of facts  (8)—(13), this rule needs some constraint. The 
statement of DRFR therefore, has to include a constraint, 
more or less of the  form:6) 
 (15) DRFR does not apply, if V contains a predicate which 
     does not admit of existential generalization such that it 
      (c-)commands everything in a but does not (c-) 
       command pro. 
This rule, I believe, rules out cases  (8)—(10) while allowing 
 (11)—(13). Another merit of this constraint is that it captures 
almost all the facts that Jackendoff's (1972, 1975) Modal
relevant predicates. However, we will not go into the realm of possible world 
semantics in the present context. For discussion, cf. Lakoff (1972) and Jackendoff 
(1972). 
6) I am forced to leave open the problem of whether  'command' or its revised 
notion  'c-command' (cf. n.3) is relevant o the determination of quantifier-scope. I 
am inclined to adopt the former view though, because if we adopt the c-command 
theory we cannot account for the fact that there are some speakers who can 
interpret (i) in such a way that everyone, which is c-commanded by someone, takes 
wide scope. 
    (i) Someone is watching everyone.
64 QUANTIFIERS, INFERENCE, AND VARIABLE BINDING 
Projection Rules are intended to cover, and that in a much 
more concise way, without, furthermore, having to adopt such 
ad hoc features as unrealized, future, possible, image, and 
perhaps many many more. 
  I assume that DRFR applies to the output of a rule that 
assigns scope relations and anaphoric relations to a given 
(near-)surface structure, which I refer to as Scope-Binding 
Rule, of the following  form:') 
(16) Scope-Binding Rule: 
 [sW  —  Qi  —  Y  —  Pro;  —  Z  [s  (Qxi)  (W—  xi—  Y—  xi—Z)] 
     Condition: (i)  Qi (c-)commands everything in S; and 
               (ii)  Qi c-commands Prof. 
Now, the rule (16) applies to (7), and gives the partially 
translated formula (17). The pronoun it in the second sentence 
cannot be converted into a variable because it is not 
c-commanded by a car. 
 (7) John has a  car;. He keeps in the garageScope-Binding) 
 (17)  (axi: car)  (John has  xi) and he keeps  iti in the garage. 
This formula meets the structural description of DRFR. If this 
rule applies to (17), we obtain the final interpretation, viz. 
(18). 
(18)  (axi: car) (John has  xi) and (az) (z  =  ((xi: car) 
     (John has  xi) and John keeps z in the garage)
The latter half of the formula (18) roughly says:  'John keeps 
the car that he has in the garage'. Intuitively, DRFR has the 
effect of forming a definite description out of an indefinite NP 
that appears in the preceding discourse.
7) This rule is distinct from the  'Quantifier Rule' as envisaged by Williams 
(1977), May (1977), etc. in that (16) simultaneously determines cope relations and 
binding relations. This might look very strange to the  just-mentioned theorists 
because they assume that quantifier scope is determined by the Sentence Grammar 
Component and that binding relation is to be represented by the Discourse 
Grammar Component. However I have  already pointed out several problems with 
this line of approach in Nishigauchi (1978).
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   This line of procedure can easily be extended to the cases 
 (1)—(2). First, the Scope-Binding Rule yields the following 
 partially translated formulae. 
  (19) a.  (txi: man)  ((ay;;  donkey)[xi owns  yi]  A  xi  beats  it;) 
      b.  (Vxi  :man) (  (Hyi  :  donkey)[xi owns  yi]  xi beats
 its) 
 In either of the formulae, the square brackets specify the 
 scope of the existential. Note also that the iota operator and 
 the universal quantifier espectively take the topmost scope. 
 The  pronoun  it; here cannot be converted into a variable 
 because it appears outside the c-command domain of a 
 donkeyi. As it stands, these are ill-formed formulae, but do 
 meet the structural description of DRFR. By the application 
 of this rule, we obtain the discourse referent as shown in (20). 
  (20) (az) (z  =  (  tyi  :  donkey)[xi owns  y;]  A  xi beats z) 
 However, as it is, this is an open sentence, because thevariable 
 xi is not bound to any logical operator. Only when the 
 formula (20) is embedded into the logical forms in (19) can we 
 get the proper epresentations. 
   (21) a.  (txi: man)  ((ay;  :  donkey)f  xi owns  yil  A 
 (Hz) (z =  (tyi  :  donkey)[xi owns  yi  ] A xi beats z)) 
      b.  (Vxi  :  man)  ((Hy;  :  donkey)[xi owns  yi]  -
        (az) (z =  (tyi:  donkey)[xi owns  y;] A  xi beats z)) 
 The formulae in (21) are (very roughly) paraphrased as: 
     rThe1    (22)t
Every'  man; who owns a  donkeyi beats the donkey 
      that  he owns. 
where the pronoun  hei is a variable bound to the quantified 
description the/every  . .  . which can take the whole S in its 
scope because it commands (and c-commands) everything 
dominated by S. (See tree diagram (5).) This, I believe, is 
in keeping with the intuitive claim exhibited by Geach (1972),
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who opted for the interpretation (22).8)
3. Some Extensions 
3.1 Opaque Contexts  Ioup (1977) observes that if an indefi-
nite NP appears in what Quine (1960) calls opaque contexts, 
i.e. those contexts in which extensionally identical terms are 
not interchangeable salva veritate, the indefinite NP is normal-
ly interpreted nonspecifically, or as having no specific referent. 
This kind of contexts is most typically induced in the 
complement of such verbs as believe, want, try, etc. Although 
I argued in Nishigauchi (1979) that it is incorrect to identify 
nonspecificty with referential opacity and that the latter 
cannot be a necessary condition for the former, although it 
surely is a sufficient condition, for the present discussion, I 
endorse the above-mentioned  claim.9)  Ioup also claims that a 
nonspecific indefinite NP cannot be linked with a definite 
pronoun, or a discourse referent, outside the c-command 
 domain.10) With this much in mind, consider the following, 
oft-quoted examples.
8) Cooper (1978) also shows that sentences like (1)—(2) require logical 
representations more or less of the form (21), though he does not give any specific 
rule for deriving these formulae. 
9) In  §3.1.2 of Nishigauchi  (1979)  I have pointed out five arguments which 
show that referential opacity does not correlate with (non)specificity. 
10) The following discourse may be taken as counter-evidence for this claim. 
   (i) A man sitting by the door touched his [Albert's] sleeve.  'Stay awhile and 
       read [a prayer book] with us.' 
 `Excuse me
, I'd like to, but I am looking for a friend.' 
 `Look
,' said the man,  'maybe you'll find him.' (B.  Malamud,  Rembrandt's 
       Hat.) 
Since look for is an opaque verb, and, furthermore, the man with whom Albert is 
talking does not know who he is looking for,  the use of him by this man may sound 
quite odd; but it is not. I conjecture that the indefinite NP here is used specifically 
(and transparently) and that it is also used  attributily (in Donnellan's (1966) 
sense):  Ioup claims that attributiveness i  essentially a pragmatic notion and is 
independent of scopal relations (which I assume determines (non)specificity), 
which I think is correct. Thus, specificity and attributiveness are no longer 
incompatible notions. The following example, due to Partee (1972), can be
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  (23) a. (*)John wants to catch a  fish; and he eats  iti for 
          supper 
      b. John wants to catch a  fish; and eat  it; for supper. 
What distinguishes these sentences is that in (23a) the 
indefinite NP a fish has to be interpreted specifically, because 
it is linked with a definite pronoun that appears outside the 
want-context, while in (23b) both the indefinite NP and the 
pronoun appear within the want-context, and (probably) for 
this reason, the indefinite NP can be (or should be) interpreted 
nonspecifically. Interestingly, on this reading, the definite 
pronoun it in (23b) is more readily paraphrased by (24a) than 
by (24b). (This fact is pointed out in Dean (1968) and Partee 
(1972).) 
  (24) a.  'the fish that John catches' 
      b.  'the fish that John wants to catch' 
This factual claim can be elegantly captured by DRFR. Notice 
that this rule does not work for (23a) (on its opaque reading) 
because believe, which is an instance of verbs of propositional 
attitude, commands its complement sentence in which the 
antecedent indefinite NP appears, but does not (c-)command 
the pronoun it; thus the constraint (15) correctly rules it out. 
On the other hand, DRFR does apply to (23b) because the 
verb believe (c-)commands both a fish and the pronoun it, and 
thus (15) does not prevent DRFR from applying. This 
sentence will be processed in the following manner." ) 
 (25) a. (23b)               Scope-Binding Rule
construed in such a way that the indefinite NP a doctor is used both specifically 
and attributively. 
   (ii) Since I heard that from a doctor (I know), I'm inclined to take it 
       seriously. He also said that aspirin would help. 
11) The dummy symbol used in (25b) stands for a null-element derived via 
Equi NP Deletion. Although I believe that this element should also be represented 
as a variable, to be bound to the matrix subject, the precise logical representation 
for this binding relation is left open here.
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     b.  John; wants  [(axi  :  fish)(Zis catch  xi) and 
 As eat  Ai]               DRFR 
     c.  Johns wants  [(x1: fish)  (As catch  xi) and  ( az) 
       (z =  ( txi: fish)  (As catch  xi) A  As eat z)] 
The logical form (25c) is roughly equivalent to: 
 (26)  Johns wants to catch a  fishi and eat the fish that  he 
      catches. 
Note that the underlined portion in (25c) explicitly represents 
the description (24a). Thus this line of approach captures the 
intuitive factual claim, put forth by Dean and Partee, in a 
formal, and mechanical manner.
3.2 Whichever Antecedent Karttunen (1977) presents some 
extremely interesting examples of anaphoric relations involv-
ing disjunction (or) as seen in: 
  (27) a. If Mary has a  carior John has a  bicycle),  itivs is in 
        the garage. 
     b. If Mary has a  cari or a bicycles,  itivs is in the garage. 
The interpretation of it in (27a) is something like  'the car 
which Mary has (if she has a car), or the bicycle that John has 
(if he has a bicycle), whichever of these it is that exists.' The 
pronoun in (27b) is also construed in a similar  way.'  ) 
 I regard this type of anaphora as deriving from the 
properties of inference induced by disjunction, in conjunction 
with the rule of forming a discourse referent, viz., DRFR. 
There are two rules of inference associated with disjunction, 
whose validity has been acknowledged in standard logic: 
Disjunction Introduction and Disjunction Elimination. The 
former rule states that if the truth of a sentence p has been 
established, then we can infer a disjunction between p and any
12) Nash-Webber (1978a, b) also considers this problem, but she does not attempt 
   to provide a formal representation for sentences (27).
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other sentence, say q. (p  -> p v q or q  -> p v q) The other ule, 
Disjunction Elimination, says that if (i) the disjunction p v q is 
true, (ii) p implies r, and (iii) q implies r, then the truth of r 
can be asserted.  ([(p v q) A (p  ---> r) A (q  -> r)]  -±  013) 
 Now, because of Disjunction Introductionand DRFR, we 
can guarantee that the following inference is logically valid 
(though pragmatically inappropriate). 
  (28) Mary has a car. Therefore, Mary's car or John's bicycle 
     exists (in the domain of discourse). 
A formal representation f the inference (28) will be some-
thing like the following." )
 (29)  (  axi  : car) (Mary has  xi)  ->  ( Hz)[z =  (cu)  [ue  {xi,  yj 
 (  (xi: car) (Mary has  xi) v  (  tyj  : bicycle) (John has  yj)  I]] 
That is to say, if Mary has a car, then we can guarantee the 
truth of the claim that there is a unique entity u such that u 
belongs to a set that consists of either Mary's car or John's 
bicycle. On the other hand, Disjunction Introduction also 
guarantees the truth of the following form. 
  (30) John has a bicycle. Therefore, Mary's car or John's 
     bicycle xists (in the domain of discourse).
If this is the case, then the formula of the form  "(Hyj :bicycle) 
(John has  yj  )" logically implies that the right-hand side of the 
material implication sign in (29) is true. 
 Given the rule of DisjunctionElimination, it is now possible 
to maintain that the following logical form is well-formed, 
because it conforms to the general structural description 
outlined above. 
 (31) ( lxi  : car) (Mary has  xi) v  (  ayi  :bicycle) (John has  y)) 
 -->  (Hz)[z =  (tu) [ue  xi,  yj I  (Lxi  : car) (Mary has  xi) v 
 (tyj  : bicycle) (John has  yi)}1  Az be in the garage]
13) For more detailed discussion, cf. Allwood et al. (1977). 
14) The curly brackets  (  1 ) stand for a set or a class, following the practice of
    mathematics.
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Thus, we can conclude that the discourse r ferent established 
in (27a) is a unique object hat belongs to the set described as: 
 yi  I  ((xi  :car)(Mary has  xi) v  (of;  : bicycle)(John has  yi)}  , or 
a set made up of  { either Mary's car or John's  bicycle  }. 
Essentially the same reasoning works for (27b) as well. 
  Incidentally, the or as seen in these sentences seems to be 
the so-called exclusive or, which is defined by the truth 
function (32a), in contrast to  'logical disjunction', orinclusive 
or, whose truth table is exhibited in (32b), because the use of 
singular pronoun it in the case where both  'Mary has a car' and 
 `John has a bicycle' are true in (32a) would be inappropriate. 
  (32) a. Exclusive Or b. Inclusive Or 
    p q  pvq p q  pvq 
  T T  F T T 
  T F  T T F 
  F T  T F T 
  F F  F F F 
However, it is not necessary, and in fact not correct, to 
represent the disjunctive as in (32a) in logical form: first, it is 
unclear whether the exclusive or is subject to the rules of 
inference discussed above; in fact, the validity of those rules 
presupposes the inclusive disjunction. Second, the use of the 
iota-operator at the top of the set-description has the function 
of picking up only one member of the  disjunction.' )
15) Consider the following examples. 
   (i) Each girl gave John a rose or a lilac. He arranged them artfully in the 
       empty bottle. 
   (ii) The man to whom each girl gave either a rose or a lilac arranged them 
       artfully in the empty bottle. 
The plural pronoun used in these examples tands for a mixed set consisting of both 
roses and lilacs (although it is not necessary that this should be so). Though I used 
to believe that this fact serves as a piece of evidence that the or relevant here is the 
inclusive disjunction, Professor  Mori has suggested to me that it cannot support the 
aforementioned claim. Without further specific evidence as for (i) and  (ii), I leave 
the status of these sentences with respect o the inclusive/exclusive controversy for 
a future research. For an attempt to represent  (i)—(ii) in the logical calculus, cf. 
Nishigauchi (1979, pp.146-148). It should be added here that the plurality of the 
discourse referents here requires a Set Formation Rule, which has the effect of 
forming a set description out of an indefinite NP that takes narrow scope.
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 Note also that the procedures (28) — (31) do not involve 
the introduction of any otherwise unmotivated rule: all the 
rules made use of here are those whose necessity has been 
established independently in the semantic literature. All we 
need is the rule of Discourse Referent Formation Rule, 
accompanied with the rules of Disjunction Introduction and 
Disjunction Elimination.
4. Conclusion 
  In this paper I have attempted to incorporate the rule of 
DRFR into the framework of interpretive semantics. It has 
been shown that this rule provides an elegant solution to the 
so-called  'Donkey Paradox' as seen in (1) — (2): its effect was 
to give an adequate interpretation while preserving the 
representation of correct scope-relation. Furthermore, this line 
of approach has offered additional support to the scopal 
analysis of referential opacity and nonspecificity: the prob-
lem raised by such examples as (8) — (13) and (23) have been 
dealt with in terms of DRFR and the constraint imposed on 
this rule, viz. (15), without having to adopt such arbitrary 
features as  [±specific] (as in Dean (1968)), or so-called  'Modal 
Operators' (as in Jackendoff (1972, 1975)). 
  Although the metatheoretical implications of DRFR have 
yet to be worked out in a more detail, I hope to have shown 
that the rule of DRFR is effective in a wide range of discourse 
anaphora  phenomena.16)
16) Specifically, the present discussion has further complicated the problem of 
how coreferentiality should be represented at the level of logical form. I think that 
what it suggests is that a logical approach to the explication of coreferentiality has 
to take care of the identity relation that holds between logical calculi. The need for 
an approach along this line has already been argued for by Sag (1977), with 
reference to Verb Phrase Anaphora. That this notion should be extended to 
Pronominal Anaphora is shown not only by the present discussion: I have argued in 
Nishigauchi (1979, Chapter IV, pp.207-221) the explication of  'Identity of Sense' 
Pronominal Anaphora as seen in (i) also requires a consideration along this line. 
   (i) The man who gives his paycheck to his wife is wiser than the man who 
       gives it to his mistress.
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